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Abstract:  Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. 
Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in 
nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines 
Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not 
need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have 
phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological 
psychology and comparative ethology. 
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Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. He begins 
with the assumption that to attempt to understand whether nonhuman organisms have 
consciousness is to be a good Darwinian and to treat them and humans as having evolutionarily 
continuous anatomical structures and behavioral capacities. He accordingly provides a great 
deal of compelling evidence of neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, and behaviorally relevant 
continuity between fish and humans to suggest that if the latter have phenomenal 
consciousness, then so too do the former. However, Woodruff’s argument is weakened by 
another assumption, namely, that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature (pp. 
4, 6-7, 13-15). Following Feinberg and Mallatt (2016), Woodruff takes it as “axiomatic” that 
mental images (i.e., mental representations) contribute to the something-it-is-like-to-be feature 
of phenomenal consciousness and, thus, sentience (Woodruff, 2017, p. 4). I think the mental 
images/representations assumption undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal 
consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via 
mental images/representations in order to have phenomenal consciousness. Note that in what 
follows I abbreviate phenomenal consciousness as ‘consciousness’ and mental 
image/representation as ‘representation.’ 
Woodruff implicitly endorses a representational theory of consciousness. In general, 
such theories hold that conscious mental states are about something (i.e., they are 
“intentional”), where that something is a depiction of other states, including the current state of 
the world (e.g., an apple on the desk in front of you), memories (e.g., recalling how many 
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windows your childhood home had), and imagination (e.g., thinking about a unicorn walking on 
a cloud; Gennaro, 2012; Lycan, 2015). This ability to represent states mentally is central to 
Woodruff’s (2017) argument: “The neural representation of the world in the tectum is 
experienced subjectively as mental images,” which “is an important insight into what it means 
for a neural system to participate in the generation of sentience” (p. 4). Woodruff asserts that 
such representations are crucial for “directed, adaptive global motor output” (pp. 3-4). Vision, 
for example, begins in the “point-by-point representation of visual space on the retina,” which is 
then transformed into a “isomorphic neural representation of visual space,” which is then 
transformed into a visual mental image (p. 4). This assumption actually weakens Woodruff’s 
case for teleost consciousness. It is in fact not necessary for information about the world to be 
transformed into isomorphic representations in order to direct adaptive motor behavior. 
Moreover, such perceptions of the world need not be representational in order to be 
phenomenological. 
One of the primary reasons often invoked to motivate the need for representations in 
perception is that the stimulus provided by the world to the organism is too impoverished to act 
upon. The retinal image alone, for instance, cannot discriminate distance, for example, that a 
tree that is small and near can cast the same retinal image as a tree that is larger and farther 
away. Consequently, the representationalist asserts that the retinal image must be 
supplemented with information stored in the mind, for example, cuing depth based on surface 
orientation (Marr, 1982/2010). Ecological psychologists argue on empirical and theoretical 
grounds that perception is direct. Even then, they agree that the retinal-image alone is 
insufficient to guide action. However, instead of going inward into the mind to find additional 
information, ecological psychologists go outward into the environment (Favela, 2016; Gibson, 
1979/1986). According to this view, visual perception is not isolated in the brain or distinct from 
action. Perception and action are inextricably connected and occur across perceptual systems 
that include the brain, body, and environment. For example, whereas the representationalist 
holds that mentally stored information about surface orientation cues depth, the ecological 
psychologist holds that temporal and movement-based features of the environment such as 
parallax can reveal depth. The former view requires information about the world to come from 
the mind; the latter derives it from the world itself. Thus, the environment serves as a rich 
source of information for visually guided action. 
If the world serves as its own best model (Brooks, 1991), then environments can serve as 
rich sources of information. If so, then there would be no need to appeal to representations to 
explain how organisms conduct successful goal-directed and adaptable behavior. Consider how 
very different anatomical structures of various organisms utilize visual information to guide 
action: compound eyes of fruit flies, convex lenses of lobsters, and crystalline holochroal eyes of 
trilobites. These organisms have no retina and thus they cannot create isomorphic neural 
representations of visual space to transform into indirect visual mental representations. Yet fruit 
flies can dodge a swatter based on visual information. How can that be if the fruit fly has neither 
retina nor neural or mental representations? It is because the fruit fly visually perceives the 
world directly: so too does the lobster and trilobite. They are able to base adaptive action on 
direct perceptions because the environment is rich with information. This is also the case for 
other organisms, even those with retinae such as birds, fish, and mammals. It is important to 
make clear here that proponents of direct perception do not go from the claim that perception 
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need not be representational to the claim that perception is without phenomenological 
experience. On the contrary, proponents of direct perception are often focused on the 
phenomenal nature of perception (Favela & Chemero, 2016; Soteriou, 2014). 
Although representations are commonly appealed to in philosophy and the cognitive, 
neural, and psychological sciences in accounts of phenomena such as visual perception, the 
truth is that “representations” are far from understood (Chemero, 2009; Freeman & Skarda, 
1990; Gallagher, 2008; Lycan, 2015; Ramsey, 2007).  
Regarding Woodruff’s representational assumption in particular, my suggestion is that 
the case for teleost consciousness can be more compelling if we focus on the ways fish perceive 
the world directly instead of trying to explain how mental images are constructed. This is 
because fish do not need, and probably do not have, mental images for their ability to perceive 
and act in the world. This by no means implies that fish do not have visual phenomenological 
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On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and 
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will 
host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss 
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-
human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does 
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What 
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness 




Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) 
 
 
Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 
8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness 
and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
